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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 05/03/2011 Accident number: 623 
Accident time: 16:50 Accident Date: 06/07/2009 




Primary cause: Victim inattention (?) Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: Not recorded 
ID original source: None Name of source: Demining group 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: M14 AP blast Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
hard 
rocks/stones 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 05/03/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east: 36.076490 E Map north: 32.531190 N 
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
standing to excavate (?) 
use of rake (?) 
Inadequate detector pinpointing 
non injurious accident (?) 
 
Accident report 
An internal demining group accident report was made available. The conversion into a DDAS 
file has led to some of the original formatting being lost.  Text in square brackets [ ] is 
editorial. 
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The internal report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
INCIDIENT INVESTIGATION [Demining group] – MINE ACTION TEAM - JORDAN 
GRID REF: 32.531190 N: 36.076490 E 
MINEFIELD NO – 360, MINEFIELD TASK ID - E 360 AL AKAIDER 4 
INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY – [Demining group], [Name removed]. 
DEMINER: [the Victim]. NIC NO (ID NUMBER): [Removed] 
SECTION COMMANDER: [Name removed]. TEAM LEADER: [Name removed]. TEAM : 
METAL DETECTOR 5. 
TIME OF INCIDENT: 04:50 PM, DATE OF INCIDENT: 6 JULY 2009 
NATURE OF INJURY: No Injury. 
TYPE OF MINE: Anti Personnel M 14 
 
IMSMA DETAILED REPORT FOR MINE INCIDENT Monday, 6 July 2009 
Part 1 – Description of the incident 
1. Organisation name: [Demining group], JORDAN Team No: Metal Detector 5. 
2. Incident date:06/07/2009. Time: 04:50 PM 
3. Location of incident: NORTH EAST SECTOR, Province: ALMAFRAQ, Village: AL 
AKAIDER. Project or task No: E 360 AL-AKAIDER 4 
4. Name of site manager or team leader: [Name removed]. 
5. Type of incident: M14 AP MINE, uncontrolled detonation of a mine. 
6. Device was detonated by: deminer  
7. Device detonated while: Raking with Heavy Rake 
8. Device was found in an area classified as: a known hazardous area 
9: Narrative (Describe how the incident happened. Attach additional pages and photographs 
or diagrams to assist in clarifying the circumstances surrounding the incident): 
While the deminer was trying to investigate a signal indicated by the metal detector and after 
the usage of the light RAKE and when she started with the heavy RAKE, the deminer hit the 
mine from the top on the pressure plate which initiated the mine. 
Part 2 – Injuries 
10. Did the incident result in any injuries? No 
11. List people injured and nature of injury: [None] 
Part 3 – Equipment damages 
12. Did the incident result in any damage to equipment or property? No 
13. List any mine action equipment or property damage: [None] 
14.  List damage to equipment or property owned by a member of the public or the 
government. Include contact details of the owner or responsible person. [None] 
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Part 4 – Explosive hazard 
15. Provide details of mines/UXO/ other devices that were involved in the incident. 
Device Type:             Method:     Determined by: 
AP (Blast) Mine         Buried        RAKING 
16. State specific device (if known): M 14 AP MINE 
17. Comments (include measurements of any crater resulting from the explosion): Crater 
Depth: approx. 15 cm / Width: approx. 40 cm 
Part 5 - Site conditions 
Describe the conditions at the site at time of the incident 
Ground/Terrain: Hard, flat 
Weather: Clear, Hot 
Vegetation: Bush, Medium 
Part 6 – Team and task details 
20. Qualifications of Member(s) involved in the incident: 
Name               Position in Location      Occupation 
[The Victim]      Deminer                       Metal Detector 5 
21. How long had this team been? 
a. At this site? 2 months 
b. working on this task? 2 months 
c. working on the day? 4:50 hours 
22. Detector type: N/A Tripwire feeler used? No 
23. Hand tool: HEAVY RAKE 
24. PPE: Vest, Visor, [Blast boots] 
25. Comments: [None] 
Part 7 - Medical & First Aid 
Medical treatment required? Yes [sic] 
26. Medical Support at Incident Site: Medic, 1st Aid Kit, Stretcher, Ambulance, Safety Vehicle, 
Radio to call forward medic. 
27. Was a Mine Incident Drill carried out? Yes No 
28. Time and distance data 
a. Time from incident to SECTION MEDICAL POINT (03) minutes 
b. Time spent at site administering treatment: nil minutes 
c. Time from evacuation FROM to arrival King Abdullah Hospital: nil minutes 
Part 8 – Reporting procedures 
Reported by: [Name removed], [Demining group] Amman Office to: [Demining group] Offices 
& NCDR 
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Investigation conducted by: [Name removed], [Name removed] 
Report compiled/translated by: [Name removed], [Name removed] 
Verified by: [Name removed] 
 
Observations and Recommendations 
the incident caused by individual mistake while the deminer using the heavy RAKE in a 
hacking motion not as the proper procedure the Raking motion, and most of the mines in the 
area are surfaces mines that they can be recovered just with the usage of the light RAKE 
even if that will cost the deminer more sweat but it will still safer. 
The usage of the light RAKE will be enforced in the area. 
Signed: Operations Coordinator: 6 JULY 2009 
 
Attachments: 
Statements by Injured Members 
Statements by Witnesses 
Photographs of Incident Site 
Copy of Incident Report 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 806 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Female 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: N/A Time to hospital: N/A 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Mask Visor 
blast boots 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Mask 
visor, blast boots 
 
Summary of injuries: 
COMMENT: No injuries recorded.  
No Medical report was made available. 
 
Statements 
Statement 1: the Victim 
I started working in the third run at lane 6 and I removed 3 AP mines and then progressed in 
my work and removed one AP mine from the front row from the enemy side, at that time 
around 15:30 pm the team leader and sector coordinator came to my site to check on my 
work, they told me that am working on the IOE C from lane 6, I entered in the fourth run to my 
4 
site and I was looking for a signal inside the mines box but the signal was deep, so I used the 
light rake at the beginning, after that I used the heavy rake when a blast happened to the 
center mine. 
Answers to Investigator Questions: 
Yes, we took the safety brief before starting to work. 
Yes, I was convinced according to what I was trained on that the signal in front of me is for an 
AP mine. 
Yes, I used the light rake at the beginning. 
Yes, the area I’m working on is hard and stony. 
No, I didn’t progress in work the right way to the right depth. 
 
Statement 2: Team Leader 
I gave my team the safety brief then I distributed them all to their sites I made QC for the 
injured deminer, she has 3 AP mines removed from the interior row then she progressed to 
the front to reach an angle in her way then in the fourth run the same day she got a signal for 
a 9 o’clock AP mine from the external row so I was confused and asked the sector 
coordinator who was available at the site to come and see the case cause we didn’t reach the 
front angle, he came and we found out that she was working on the IOE C from the same 
lane, the same day at 16:50 pm while the deminer was looking for the center mine and 
working around the target the blast happened and I informed everybody about the accident. 
Answers to Investigator Questions: 
Yes, I informed the team that when they see a signal of a mine they should let me know about 
it. 
Yes, I assured everybody to use the light rake at the beginning. 
Yes, I informed the team to follow all the instructions in their progress in work. 
 
Statement 3: Section Commander 
In the 3rd run I checked on the deminer and explained to her how she should work, she was 
heading to a cluster of mines she removed 3 of them from the interior row, then a signal 
shown to her on her way it was a 9 o’clock AP mine from the external row, then I asked the 
team leader to show us where she is working cause there were a short angle in front of her 
which is far from the mines box, he came with the sector coordinator and they told us she was 
working on IOE C from this mine field, around 16:50 pm from the fourth run the deminer was 
progressing to reach the signal place she was working on the right of the mine she removed 
and there where the center mine, a blast happened and I informed about the accident. 
Answers to Investigator Questions: 
Yes, I explained to every deminer the nature of her work. 
Yes, I assured everyone to use the light rake at the beginning. 





The primary cause of this accident is listed as Victim Inattention because the Victim 
recognised that she had not been using the rakes in the correct way when the accident 
occurred. The secondary cause is listed as Unavoidable because there is always a risk of 
initiating a mine with the heavy rake so it is possible that the accident could not have been 
avoided with the procedure. When searching for small mines, there is compelling evidence 
that the procedure can be safe even when a mine is initiated (because of the distance from 
the blast and the correct use of PPE). 
The demining group who made this report available is thanked for its transparency and its 
professional concern to share lessons that can be learned from accidents. This record, along 
with several other records where rakes were used, provide compelling evidence that the 
controlled use of rakes can be both effective and tolerably safe (reducing risk of severe injury 
to tolerable levels). 
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